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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v.
LAWRENCE REED,
                                    Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No.  08-cr-00265)
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 1, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 2, 2010)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Lawrence Reed appeals his judgment of sentence.  We will affirm.
I.
Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts.
In 2007, United States Postal Service (USPS) investigators discovered that Reed, a
34-year USPS employee, was regularly using his work computer to search for and view
child pornography.  An examination of Reed’s computer revealed 127 stored images of
child pornography.  When confronted, Reed admitted his conduct.
Reed pleaded guilty to a single count of possession of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).  It is undisputed that the District Court correctly 
calculated Reed’s advisory Guidelines imprisonment range as 57 to 71 months.  Reed
argued for a significant downward variance, proposing an alternative sentence of just one
day of imprisonment coupled with 20 years of supervised release.
In support of his request, Reed called two psychologists who testified that he had
been sexually abused as a child, which led him to engage in and seek treatment for
sexually compulsive behavior throughout his adult life.  Reed’s experts agreed that he
was responding well to outpatient therapy and opined that he presented a low risk of
recidivism.  The Government countered with a psychiatrist who testified that Reed’s long
history of unsuccessful treatment, together with his escalating pattern of sexually
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have1
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
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compulsive behavior, made Reed’s recidivism risk uncertain.  After hearing argument, the
District Court denied Reed’s request and sentenced him to 57 months imprisonment.1
II.
Reed appeals his sentence, arguing that it was both procedurally and substantively
unreasonable.  We review the District Court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.  United
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)).  Reed bears the burden of showing his sentence was
unreasonable.  See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006).
A.
Reed first argues that the District Court erred procedurally by basing his sentence
on an incorrect factual finding regarding his risk of recidivism.  A district court commits
procedural error—and thereby abuses its discretion—when it selects a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts.  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).
Reed claims that the District Court clearly erred when it concluded that he “posed
a high risk of recidivism” because the balance of the expert testimony suggested that his
risk of re-offending was low.  Contrary to Reed’s characterization, however, the District
Court never found that Reed “posed a high risk of recidivism.”  Rather, the court found,
based on all of the expert testimony, that it “[could not] conclude . . . that there’s no risk
4of future criminal conduct from [Reed].”  Because Reed posed at least some risk of
recidivism, the District Court found protection of the public to be a relevant factor under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) when fashioning Reed’s sentence.
This was not clear error.  A factual “finding is clearly erroneous when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing body on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  Wise, 515 F.3d at 218
(quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The record in this
case gives us no cause for such concern.  At sentencing, none of the experts testified that
Reed presented absolutely no risk of re-offending.  Indeed, Reed’s own psychologists
admitted that although he posed a low risk of recidivism, future criminal conduct could
not be ruled out altogether.  Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by
sentencing Reed based on a clearly erroneous factual finding.
B.
Reed next contends that the District Court committed procedural error by failing to
give meaningful consideration to three of his sentencing arguments.  A district court need
not “discuss every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly without merit.” 
Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329.  The record must demonstrate, however, that the court
recognized and responded to any colorable arguments advanced by a defendant at
sentencing.  United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006).
5Reed first claims that the District Court failed to consider his argument that the
circumstances of his offense and his personal history and characteristics warranted a
downward variance.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).  The record indicates otherwise.  After
observing that the facts of Reed’s crime were fairly “straightforward,” the District Court
noted that Reed was a hard-working individual with strong family support and no
criminal record.  The Court next discussed Reed’s extensive history of psychological
issues.  Though the District Court recognized the significance of these factors, it
explained that they were not atypical for a child pornography defendant and therefore did
not warrant a variance.  Accordingly, the District Court considered both the
circumstances of Reed’s offense as well as his personal history and characteristics when
imposing sentence.
Reed also argues that the District Court failed to consider his need for “intensive,
uninterrupted mental health treatment.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).  Prior to
sentencing, however, the District Court requested and received information from the
parties regarding treatment options within the Bureau of Prisons for incarcerated sex
offenders.  At sentencing, the Court heard extensive testimony about Reed’s ongoing
participation in an outpatient counseling program.  The District Court then offered to
recommend that Reed be designated to a facility with a sex offender treatment program,
an offer Reed declined.  It is thus clear from the record that the District Court considered
Reed’s need for psychological counseling.
6Finally, Reed asserts that the District Court failed to address the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants.  See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6).  In support of this argument, Reed relies on six cases he cited to the District
Court in which defendants convicted of similar offenses received significant downward
variances.  According to Reed, the District Court failed to explain why his case warranted
a different sentence.
At sentencing, however, the District Court expressly recognized that other courts
had imposed sentences well below the applicable Guidelines range in similar child
pornography cases.  Contrary to Reed’s assertion, the District Court then explained that
an individualized application of the § 3553(a) factors to Reed’s case required a different
result.  In particular, the District Court focused on the seriousness of Reed’s offense and
his potential for recidivism.  The District Court thus did not err by failing to consider the
need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.
C.
Reed also contends that his 57-month sentence was substantively unreasonable
because it was too severe in light of the circumstances of his offense.  But when a
“district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for
the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Here, the District Court
committed no procedural error at sentencing.  Because “the record as a whole reflects
7rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)[,]” id. (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en
banc)), we conclude that Reed’s sentence was substantively reasonable.
III.
Having found no procedural or substantive error, we will affirm the District
Court’s judgment of sentence.
